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In this paper, we address the issue of how education affected income inequality in twentieth-century 
Africa. Three channels are identified through which education may affect income inequality. First, 
an increase in the average educational level is correlated with an increase in average income, which, 
ceteris paribus, reduces inequality. Second, a reduction in educational inequality may, given a 
positive correlation between education level and income, reduce income inequality. Thirdly, an 
increase in the supply of education may decrease the price of skilled labour thus lowering income 
inequality. 
 We find that in the long-run education does not affect income growth, indicating that in 
twentieth-century Africa it was inspiration (i.e., Total Factor Productivity [TFP]) rather than 
perspiration (i.e., education and physical capital) that drove economic development. Testing for the 
effects of the remaining two channels, we found a significant non-linear relationship between 
educational and income inequality suggesting that, contrary to the level of education, these two 
channels were important in determining income inequality in Africa. Taking an example from the 
end of the twentieth century, if educational equality had been eliminated, then income inequality 
would decline by no less than 81%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
Education is often considered the driver of economic welfare.  It has a direct effect on income by 
increasing labour productivity
1
 and an indirect effect by improving institutional structures by 
enhancing democracy
2
 or reducing corruption,
3 
even though this relationship is not necessarily 
monotonic.
4
  Yet remarkably little attention has been paid to the role of education in the much 
discussed 'African growth tragedy'. For lack of data, much of the discussion has focussed on what 
may be called the 'ultimate sources of growth', i.e., geographical and biological factors
5
 and 
institutional ones such as colonial policy
6
 rather than on the proximate sources like factor 
endowments. Indeed, '[f]actor endowments […] have gone out of focus for a generation of 
economic historians more impressed by the importance of institutions and information problems in 
shaping economic behaviour'.
7
  
 This literature is generally pessimistic about Africa's future, since its geographical and 
institutional endowments are unlikely to improve significantly, and the negative consequences of its 
colonial past are liable to continue to take a heavy toll for the foreseeable future. Due to their 
persistence over time, neither of these factors can account for catastrophic reversals of fortune.
8
 
Based on these studies, it is hard to believe today that during the 1960s African growth potential 
outstripped that of Asia. However, it is the fact that geographical and institutional forces are 
channelled through shifting factors of production that explains the shifting nature of Africa's 
fortunes.
9
  
 Especially education has been widely recognised as a factor of production that drives long-
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+run economic fortunes. However, for Africa, on the one hand it is widely recognized that Africa is 
deficient in regard to education as well as physical capital
10
 while, on the other hand Prados de la 
Escosura finds that education has been the driving force behind the improvement, admittedly 
meagre, in the continent's Human Development Index (HDI) since the 1930s.
11
 This latter view is 
also shared by Rimmer in the case of late colonial Ghana for which he argued that growth was not 
limited by lack of skilled labour.
12
 
 The focus of this paper is therefore on the effect of education on economic inequality among 
African nations since the early 1930s. It is organized as follows. Beginning Section 2 with a 
discussion of welfare trends, we distinguish three effects. One of them -- that of education on per 
capita income and, ceteris paribus, on income inequality -- will be the subject of Section 3. We find, 
however, that the impact of education on income is both insignificant and indirect. Section 4 than 
moves on to the other two channels through which education affects income inequality. We find that 
if educational inequality decreases, so will income inequality. Likewise, we find that an excess 
supply of education lowers its price and hence income inequality as well. We end with a brief 
conclusion.   
 
II 
For lack of data, the question of how income and education in Africa evolved over the course of the 
twentieth century, especially prior to about 1950, cannot be answered with any precision.   
Maddison (2007) is virtually our sole source (a few benchmark estimates) of data on per capita 
GDP for the first half of the century and our chief source for the second half.
13
 For the years after 
ca. we draw on the Conference Board's Total Economy Database (2012).
14
  
 There are three ways to remedy the inadequacy of the data on changes in regional per capita 
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 Rimmer, Staying poor. 
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income in Africa prior to 1950 (the regions being those defined by the United Nations: North, West, 
Central, East, and Southern)
15
 .  First, some data exist for a few countries.  Second, we can draw on 
real-wage data in the work of Frankema and Van Waijenburg to proxy per capita income (2011)
16
  
provided that there is no significant change in the share of wage income  in total income and in the 
number of days worked.
17
 Third, we can use Prados de la Escosura's preliminary estimates of GDP 
per capita, which he made  by running a regression of GDP per capita on the income terms of trade 
per head, a time trend, and several dummy variables capturing colonizer effects, regional effects, 
and a dummy for countries with access to the sea.
18
 Unfortunately, however, since we cannot 
assume that the relation between terms of trade and per capita GDP remains unchanged, we risk 
underestimating the level of the latter during the first half of the century. Thus while each 
estimation method if used in isolation has significant drawbacks, they are quite useful when used in 
combination, functioning as they do as cross-checks.  
 For North Africa, we obtain data from GDP estimates by Amin (1966), covering benchmark 
years between 1880 and 1955 for Algeria, between 1910 and 1955 for Tunisia, and between 1920 
and 1955 for Morocco.
19
 All of these data are connected to the 1950 benchmark expressed in 1990 
GK dollars. For Egypt, our data come from Yousef (2002).
20
 We assume that the population-
weighted average of per capita GDP of these countries reflects the trend in North Africa for the 
period before 1950 (see Table 1). However, since Yousef’s data, especially for the years prior to 
1900, indicate higher growth rates than do those of Hansen and Marzouk (1965) and of Hansen 
(1979, 1991)
21
 our estimates for 1890 are slightly lower than they would have been had we used 
Hansen's data. One way to cross-check this result is to compare it with those of Prados de la 
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  Frankema and Van Waijenbrug, ‘African real wages’.  
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21
  Hansen and Marzouk, Development and economic policy; Hansen, ‘Income and consumption in Egypt’; Hansen, 
The political economy of poverty.  
 Escosura (2011), who finds GDP per capita in North Africa in 1890 to be 802 GK dollars, versus 
our 559.
22
 The main reason for this difference is Egypt. Unfortunately, it is difficult to substantiate 
which series to believe. The series from Yousef (2002), on which our series is based, is in line with 
the real wage series for Egypt,
23 
while the Hansen (1979, 1991) series decline less back to 1880.
 For West and East Africa, GDP data are scantier. Szereszewski's 1891-1911 and 1966 Ghana 
data
24
 are the best that we have for West Africa. However, he presumes that change occurs only in 
the 'modern' sector; since the indigenous sector is far larger, his results indicate that economic 
development was more limited than, in fact, it was. Yet, according to real wage series provided by 
Frankema and Van Waijenburg (2011),
25
 between 1890 and 1950 the indigenous economy generated 
a significant increase in per capita income. Using their real-wage data, we find that in 1890 Ghana's 
GDP was roughly 760 GK dollars, compared to ca. 516 from Prados de la Escosura.
26
  This 
discrepancy suggests that a trade-based approach may lead to an underestimation of GDP for West 
Africa in general. For East Africa, data are even scarcer: Deane (1946) estimated the national 
income of Northern Rhodesia (i.e., Zambia) at 7.63 mln GDP in 1938 or 418 1990 GK dollars. 
Fortunately, we also have the numbers for real wages (Frankema and van Waaijenburg 2011), which 
show that (assuming that they move in line with per capita income) average GDP per capita in 1910 
was about 484 GK dollars.
27
 For the Southern region (i.e., South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Namibia, and Botswana), we converted data from Krogh and Willers (1962)
28
 into constant prices 
and linked these per capita GDP series to the 1950 benchmark average of these five countries.   
The resulting estimates of GDP per capita in Africa are reported in Table 1. The average 
African per capita GDP increases from 683 GK dollars in 1900 to 2,023 GK dollars around 2010:   . 
slightly higher than the estimate of Smits (2006), 524 GK dollars, for sub-Saharan Africa  in 1913.
29
 
Corrected for North Africa from Table 1, this results in an overall African GDP per capita from 
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ªSmits of about 610 GK dollars. Likewise, Prados de La Escosura
30
 estimated average per capita 
GDP for Africa around 1913 at 772 GK dollars. The three methods thus generate similar results, 
 
Table 1. Per capita GDP in Africa by sub-region, ca. 1890-2010 
  
North 
Africa 
West 
Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East 
Africa 
Southern  
Africa 
Total 
Africa 
1890 559 752     
1900 714 863  508  683 
1910 832 586  484  641 
1920 960 867  771 871 836 
1930 1,059 1,230  600 1,329 976 
1940 1,075 718  728 1,909 889 
1950 1,085 757 729 800 2,425 968 
1960 1,279 871 909 953 2,919 1,151 
1970 1,648 1,098 1,036 1,178 3,904 1,459 
1980 2,285 1,217 888 1,155 4,257 1,657 
1990 2,354 1,041 812 1,061 3,764 1,549 
2000 2,712 1,024 577 1,031 3,886 1,575 
2010 3,590 1,436 749 1,245 4,972 2,023 
       
       
with Southern Africa growing significantly faster than the other regions, with the exception of 
North Africa since the 1970s, which obviously profited from its oil reserves.  Per capita income 
stagnated in all of the other regions except Central Africa, where it declined. To explain this income 
divergence among countries, which, as we shall see in Section 4 also occurred within countries, we 
turn our attention to the factors that affected this distribution of income, and most importantly, 
education.  
As for education, the earliest estimates are from Benavot and Riddle, who report primary 
enrolment ratios (i.e., the total number of students divided by the relevant age class) for the period 
1870-1940.
31
 The most interesting finding is that the primary-school enrolment rates in sub-Saharan 
and North Africa are not significantly different. However, this result is liable to reflect a sample-
selection bias, since national enrolment rates tend to be directly correlated with statistical coverage. 
In another study, Morrisson and Murtin (2009) estimated average years of education for every tenth 
                                                 
30
  Prados de la Escosura, ‘Human development in Africa’, Table D-4.    ). 
31
  Benavot and Riddle, ‘The expansion of primary education’.  
year for a set of 23 African countries between 1870 and 2010.
32
 For the period after 1960 they based 
their data largely on Cohen and Soto (2007),
33
 while for the pre-1960 period they assumed that 
enrolment declines steadily back to zero at the start of the nineteenth century. Finally, the most 
comprehensive dataset in terms of the number of countries covered is that of Barro and Lee (2010), 
who provide data on average years of education for most of the countries under study for every fifth 
year since 1950.
34
  
 Unfortunately, these datasets do not contain annual data nor do they cover a broad sway 
swathe of countries and/or time periods. The only dataset that contains annual estimates (Nehru et 
al. 1995)
35
 covers only the period 1960-1987 and is furthermore based on a perpetual-inventory 
method (PIM), generally considered less reliable than estimates based on census data. Our first 
order of business in this paper, therefore, was to establish a new set of annual estimates of average 
years of education for most African countries; the method we used -- described in Van Leeuwen and 
Foldvari (2012)
36
  -- relies on census data for benchmark years, derived mostly from Cohen and 
Soto (2007).
37
 Estimates for the intervening years are calculated by means of the PIM-methodology 
as proposed in Barro and Lee (2001).
38
 Since this method leads to an overestimation when 
calculating backward and an underestimation when calculating forward, we use a weighted average 
of the two sets of figures.
39
 For the period before the first census, we use a perpetual-inventory  
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  Morrisson and Murtin, ‘The century of education’.  
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35
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  Van Leeuwen and Foldvari, ‘Capital accumulation and growth’.  
37
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38
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ªTable 2. Population weighted average years of education in Africa, ca. 1890-2010 
  
Nehru et 
al.  
(1995) 
Baier, et. 
al. (2006) 
Cohen 
and Soto 
(2007) 
Morrisson 
and 
Murtin 
(2009) 
Barro 
and Lee 
(2010) This text 
1890    0.2   
1900    0.2   
1910    0.2  **0.3 
1920    0.3  0.3 
1930    0.4  0.5 
1940    0.5  0.6 
1950  1.5  0.7 0.8 0.9 
1960 0.9 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 
1970 1.3 2.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.7 
1980 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.3 
1990 *2.5 4.2 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.4 
2000  4.8 3.7 4.0 3.6 4.3 
2010   4.1 4.5 4.1 4.9 
*1987, **1915  
 
method, which corrects for age-specific mortality. The enrolment data are obtained from UNESCO 
through the intermediary of the Education Policy and Data Center (accessed 2011), Mitchell (1999), 
and for earlier periods from Frankema (2012) and the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
(various issues).
40
 The population data were obtained from Maddison (2007), the United States 
Census Bureau, International Programs (accessed 2011), and the House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (various issues).
41
 
 The results are reported in Table 2 together with some competing estimates. Our estimates 
are virtually identical to those of Cohen and Soto (2007) and Morrisson and Murtin (2009),
42
 there 
being few differences for the post-1960 period. Two differences between our series and those of 
Morrisson and Murtin are worth noting: our dataset includes about twice as many countries, and we 
do not find the enrolment ratio going linearly back to zero at the start of the nineteenth century.   
 To test the relative reliability of our series, we regressed each of two alternative estimates of 
                                                 
40
  Education Policy and Data Center (accessed 2011); Mitchell, International historical statistics; Frankema, ‘The 
origins of formal education’; House of Commons, ‘Statistical Tables’.  
41
  Maddison, Contours of the world economy; United States Census Bureau, ‘International Programs’; House of 
Commons, ‘Statistical Tables’. 
42
  Cohen and Soto, ‘Growth and human capital’; Morrisson and Murtin, ‘The century of education’. 
ªthe same latent variable on the other.
43
 Since the measurement error of the dependent variable will 
not affect the OLS estimate of the slope coefficient, the resulting coefficient may be interpreted as 
the error-to-signal ratio in the explanatory variable. The results are reported in Table 3. Our  
 
Table 3. Reliability ratio average years of education 
 
 Barro and Lee 
(2010) 
 (1950-2010) 
Baier et al. (2006) 
(1917-2000) 
Cohen and Soto 
(2007) 
(1960-2010) 
Morrisson and 
Murtin (2009) 
(1870-1950) 
Morrison and 
Murtin (2009) 
(1950-2010) 
estimated error-
to-signal variance 
ratio, compared 
to own estimates 
36.5% 297% 5.2% 13.3% 11.7% 
the estimated 
error-to-signal 
variance ratio of 
own estimates 
compared with 
other estimates. 
11.1% 13.1% 0% 11.9% 8.3% 
Note: measurement error variance relative to signal variance, a lower number means less noisy estimates 
 
 
estimates outperform those of Barro and Lee (2010) and Baier et al. (2006) significantly
44
 but those 
of Cohen and Soto and of  Morrisson and Murtin only slightly, since they are based on similar 
data.
45
  
 When we use these data to look at the long-run pattern of education in Africa by sub-region, 
we find that Southern Africa did especially well in terms of years of education throughout most of 
the twentieth century (Table 4 and Map 1), only the North eventually catching up,  after the 1970s. 
The validity of these results, however, has been confirmed by Crayen and Baten (2007), who, using 
age-heaping methodology, found a remarkably high degree of age heaping (hence a low numeracy) 
in North Africa in 1890 followed by a gradual improvement. One might argue that a Muslim 
presence might explain the fact that until the 1970s North Africa performed poorly, in terms 
 
 
                                                 
43
  Krueger and Lindahl, ‘Education for growth’.  
44
  Baier et al., ‘How important are capital and total factor productivity’; Barro and Lee, ‘A new dataset on educational 
attainment’. 
45
  Cohen and Soto, ‘Growth and human capital’; Morrisson and Murtin, ‘The century of education’. 
ªTable 4. Average years of education in Africa by sub-region, ca. 1890-2010 
  
North 
Africa 
West 
Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East 
Africa 
Southern  
Africa 
Total 
Africa 
1890  0.1     
1900  0.1     
1915 0.2 0.1  0.2 1.8 0.3 
1920 0.3 0.1  0.3 2.0 0.3 
1930 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 2.4 0.5 
1940 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 2.9 0.6 
1950 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.0 3.5 0.9 
1960 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.5 4.2 1.2 
1970 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.9 4.7 1.7 
1980 2.4 1.5 2.0 2.4 5.1 2.3 
1990 3.9 2.5 3.1 3.3 5.7 3.4 
2000 5.2 3.4 3.6 4.0 7.2 4.3 
2010 6.1 3.9 4.0 4.5 8.5 4.9 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1. Average years of education in Africa, 2010 
 
(6.32715,10.4053]
(4.54657,6.32715]
(3.34713,4.54657]
[1.42827,3.34713]
No data
 
 
 
of both average years of education and numeracy, but Crayen and Baten (2007) cast doubt on this 
explanation, observing that nearby Christian and Hindu populations had not appreciably higher 
ªlevels of numeracy.
46
 In addition, both numeracy and years of education varied considerably 
throughout the region, Algeria and Tunisia having the highest rates on both counts. Egypt had the 
lowest numeracy rate, but this may be because Sudan and Libya were not included in the numeracy 
dataset However, in the average years of education dataset they rated below Egypt.  
 These findings hint at a statistical relationship between educational attainment and per capita 
income. After all, per capita income as well as the level of education was clearly higher in Southern 
African than in the remainder.  Likewise, the economic expansion in North Africa coinciding as it 
did with the improvements on the education front in the 1970s. Still, a simple co-movement of 
education and per capita income is not evidence of a structural/causal relationship, and any two-
variable statistical approach we might use to find such a structural relationship would suffer from a 
bias due to the omission of the remaining factor of production: physical capital -- to which we will 
now, therefore, briefly turn our attention. 
We draw on five datasets: those of Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006), Miketa (2004), 
Easterly and Levine (2002), Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993), and the extended Penn World Tables 
(Marquetti and Foley 2011).
47
 Given the differences in methodology, it is impossible to estimate the 
reliability ratio for the data.
48
 The linear correlation coefficients among the different series, which 
are reported in Table 5, may shed some information on their reliability though. It seems clear that 
the Nehru series constitute the major outlier, being negatively correlated with the other series, in 
regard to levels and first differences.
49
 The other series are largely comparable, even though the 
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  Crayen and Baten, ‘Global trends in numeracy’.  
47
  Baier et al., ‘How important are capital and total factor productivity’; Miketa, ‘Technical description on the growth 
study datasets’; Easterly and Levine, ‘It’s not factor accumulation’; Nehru and Dhareshwar, ‘A new database on 
physical capital stock’;  Marquetti and Foley, ‘Extended Penn World Tables’.  
48
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different trends, at least some of them must be biased. Consequently, the OLS estimates of the reliability ratio would 
also have a component resulting from the bias, and this cannot be isolated. 
49
  Nehru and Dhareshwar, ‘A new database on physical capital stock’. 
BTable 5. Correlation of physical capital series 
  
Nehru and 
Dhareshwar 
(1993) 
Miketa 
(2004) 
Easterly and 
Levine 
(2002) 
Baier, Dwyer 
and Tamura 
(2006) 
Extended 
Penn World 
Tables 
(Marquetti 
and Foley 
2011) 
 Level-level 
      
Nehru and 
Dhareshwar 
1.000     
Miketa 
-0.124 
(0.010) 
1.000    
Easterly and 
Levine 
-0.121 
(0.012) 
0.942 
(0.000) 
1.000   
Baier, Dwyer and 
Tamura 
-0.088 
(0.572) 
0.926 
(0.000) 
0.975 
(0.000) 
1.000  
Extended Penn 
World Tables 
-0.039 
(0.417) 
0.925 
(0.000) 
0.890 
(0.000) 
0.8145 
(0.000) 
1.000 
      
 First differences 
Nehru and 
Dhareshwar 
1.000     
Miketa 
-0.089 
(0.075) 
1.000    
Easterly and 
Levine 
-0.096 
(0.054) 
0.877 
(0.000) 
1.000   
Baier, Dwyer and 
Tamura 
-0.111 
(0.605) 
0.842 
(0.000) 
0.863 
(0.000) 
1.000  
Extended Penn 
World Tables 
-0.090 
(0.072) 
0.669 
(0.000) 
0.784 
(0.000) 
0.466 
(0.000) 
1.000 
      
      
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Easterly and Levine (2002) and Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) series have an especially close 
correlation (in regard to levels and first differences).
50
 We therefore prefer to start with the Extended 
Penn World Tables (especially since it includes the greatest quantity of data) and add the Easterly 
and Levine (2002) and the Miketa (2004) data when appropriate.  
The results are reported in Table 6. In order to predict physical capital per capita backwards, 
we ran a regression of regional physical capital per capita on regional average years of education 
and per capita GDP.  While this makes the resulting estimates for the years before 1950 dependent 
                                                 
50
  Baier et al., ‘How important are capital and total factor productivity?’; Easterly and Levine, ‘It’s not factor 
accumulation’. 
on GDP and education we have no reason to omit them, since they will not be used in the 
regressions presented in the following sections. We find that the level of physical capital was 
 
Table 6. Per capita physical capital in Africa by sub-region, ca. 1920-2010  
 
  
North 
Africa 
West 
Africa 
Central 
Africa 
East 
Africa 
Southern  
Africa 
Total 
Africa 
1920 753 617     
1930 1,032 904  647 803 890 
1940 1,287 745 1,254 798 1,434 1,015 
1950 1,538 796 1,077 932 2,404 1,155 
1960 1,679 988 921 1,056 3,788 1,403 
1970 2,094 1,116 939 1,256 5,376 1,691 
1980 4,102 1,403 1,139 1,697 7,336 2,560 
1990 4,527 1,015 1,058 1,603 6,059 2,410 
2000 3,875 756 844 1,630 5,625 2,062 
2010 4,881 944 819 1,764 7,250 2,439 
              
 
 
 
Map 2. Physical capital/GDP ratio in Africa , 1960 
 
(1.54942,4.78272]
(.95135,1.54942]
(.607721,.95135]
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No data
 
 
especially high in Southern Africa, whereas in North Africa it soared only after the 1970s (see also 
Map 2). West and Central Africa were at the back of the pack. It is thus evident not only that 
Beducational level, but also physical capital is correlated with per capita GDP. However, this does not 
tell us anything yet about causation (i.e. whether it is education, conditional upon the presence of 
physical capital, that affects per capita income or vice versa). This is the topic of the following 
Section. 
III 
As we have just seen, a rise in the average level of education is correlated with a rise in the level of 
per capita income and thus a decline in the overall level of inequality.
51
 Those who argue that 
growth in Southeast Asia has been driven mostly by factors of perspiration (i.e., the factors of 
production) rather than those of inspiration (i.e., TFP)
52 
might very well argue that this correlation 
also represents causation (i.e. education affecting per capita GDP instead of the reverse) in regard to 
Africa.  
However, an analysis of the role of education in economic growth requires an understanding 
of its dual role: as a human-capital channel and as the cornerstone of national institutional structures 
that address basic quality-of-life issues, including health care. Whereas the second role directly 
relates education to institutions and social variables, the first role is more controversial since it 
generally refers to human capital rather than education. Yet, since human capital is a latent variable 
there is no consensus on how this channel functions; the most popular approach is simply to use 
education as a proxy thereof. A second possible way is to use the so-called Mincerian human 
capital
53
 the idea being that the per capita stock of human capital can be estimated from average 
years of education (St) and the rate of private returns to education (rt) as follows: 
ln t t th r S=  (1) 
where the change of the rate of return on education over time is often assumed to be a function of 
                                                 
51
 To understand why, see ‘A simple way to calculate the Gini coefficient’ in which Milanovic derives the relation 
between the Gini coefficient and the Coefficient of Variation (CV), which is the standard deviation divided by the 
mean. If the CV increases by 1 unit the Gini coefficient will increase by 
1
3
unit.   
52
  Krugman, ‘The myth of Asia’s miracle’.  
53
  For example, Hall and Jones, ‘Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?’; 
Pritchett, ‘Where has all the education gone?’.  
Bthe average years of education.  
We have already critiqued the various approaches in other papers;
54 
so this time, our purpose 
is, instead of analyzing how human capital affects per capita income, to analyze the role of 
education in income inequality. Not only is education one of the most important way to empirically 
capture human capital, but it is also the variable that governments can most easily manipulate and, 
as such, function as an important policy objective. Hence, seeing how education affects income 
inequality is very useful from a policy perspective.  
 
 A simple way to determine both the short- and the long-run relationships between per capita 
income and education is to estimate an error-correction representation of the production function of 
per capita GDP, with physical capital and education as explanatory variables. The direction of 
causality is irrelevant, since we are looking for a long-run equilibrium relationship (cointegration). 
The unit-root tests (see Table A1) suggest that all variables are integrated of order one, so the 
theoretical possibility of cointegration does exists. The error-correction specification is as follows: 
0 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1ln ln ln lnit it it it it it i t ity k S y k S uβ β β β β β η λ− − −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + + + + + + (2) 
where lny, lnk, and S denote the per capita GDP, per capita physical capital stock, and the average 
years of education. The immediate effects are reflected in the coefficients β1 and β2, while the long-
run coefficients (cointegrating vector elements) and the adjustment coefficient can be estimated 
from the coefficients β3-β5. For comparison we also report the coefficients from a level-on-level 
specification (static panel), but the presence of a high degree of first-order autocorrelation in the 
residuals is a clear sign of a spurious regression.
55
  
While the level-on-level specification seems to suggest that the relationship between 
education and per capita income is positive, once we rewrite the specification into an error-
correction model (ECM), it  changes to negative, indicating that in the long run an increase in 
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  Van Leeuwen and Foldvari, ‘Capital accumulation and growth in Hungary’; Van Leeuwen and Foldvari, ‘Capital 
accumulation and growth in Central Europe’.  
55
  The ECM representation is basically a dynamic panel model, but as T is large, we do no need to worry about the 
finite sample bias in fixed-effect dynamic panel models.  
BTable 7. Static and dynamic panel analysis of income on physical capital and education 
 ln ity  ln ity∆  
constant 4.257 
(9.47) 
0.167 
(4.89) 
ln itk∆  - 0.196 
(9.06) 
itS∆  - -0.045 
(-1.95) 
1ln ity −  - -0.025 
(-3.94) 
1ln itk −  - 0.004 
(1.17) 
1itS −  - -0.005 
(-2.15) 
ln itk  0.354 
(7.15) 
- 
itS  0.092 
(1.69) 
- 
R
2 
0.921 0.164 
N 2311 2265 
Note: years and country dummies included but not reported. 
 
 
educational level is correlated with a decrease in per capita income. More specifically, the long-run 
effect, -0.005/0.025=-0.2, is economically significant:  one additional year of education is correlated 
with a 20 per cent decrease in per capita income in the long run.   
Moreover, this specification provides no indication of a long-run relationship between 
physical capital and per capita GDP.  While there is a short-run positive effect, the absence of a 
significant coefficient in the cointegrating vector suggests that investments do not cause any 
improvement in the factors of production or productivity -- a finding that extends to the second half 
of the twentieth century confirming Austin's conclusion that in the long run Africa's production 
function consists of a single factor: labour.
56
 While we are not the first to arrive at these results (see 
also Pritchett 2001),
57 
their counterintuitive nature compels us to cross-check them by means of a 
panel VAR analysis.   
While this is not yet a standard methodology, it has three advantages over estimating panel 
regressions for each of the variables individually. First, it is likely that there is a simultaneous 
                                                 
56
  Austin, Labour, land and capital in Ghana, p. 73. 
57
  Pritchett, ‘Where has all the education gone?’. 
relationship between capital stock and per capita income, which would require instrumentation, and 
it is very difficult to find adequate time-varying instruments for African countries.  Second, since 
this analysis involves estimating the impulse-response functions (IRFs), it is more efficient than 
other methodologies, permitting us to combine our estimates of the short- and long-run effects. 
Third, it obviates the need to specify a system of structural equations, which would be based on 
various assumptions requiring verification. 
We specify the following PVAR model  as follows: 
1=
= + + +∑
p
j
it i j i,t-j t it
Y δ Θ Y η u (3) 
where ( )ln , ln , ′= it it ity k SitY  , iδ and tη are the country and the time-specific effects, and tu denotes 
the vector of the residuals estimated from the PVAR. The country-specific effects are captured by 
country dummies, the time-specific effects by a quadratic time trend. 
The residuals are likely to be correlated on account of the simultaneous relationship among 
the endogenous variables. The primitive form of the above VAR system can be written as: 
1=
= + + +∑
p
j
it i j i,t-j t it
AY α β Y λ ε (4) 
where matrix A denotes a matrix of coefficients describing the simultaneous relationship among the 
endogenous variables, iα and tλ are the country-  and the time-specific effects, and tε denotes the 
vector of equation-specific shocks. 
The VAR coefficients will therefore not be equal to the coefficients from the primitive form,   
unless there is no simultaneity among the dependent variables (i.e., matrix A is a unit matrix):   
  
1 1 1 1
1
− − − −
=
= + + +∑
p
j
it i j i,t-j t it
Y A α A β Y A λ A ε (5)  
As a result, the residuals as estimated from the VAR cannot be used to obtain IRFs without 
identifying the matrix A (Structural VAR).  
As for the order of the VAR system, we used the Akaike Information Criterion, which 
preferred a VAR(9) specification when the quadratic trend was included and a VAR(11) when it was 
Bnot. At these lag lengths the VAR system fulfilled the stability criterion, which is the fundamental 
requirement for obtaining meaningful IRFs. The residual autocorrelation remained insignificant at 
one per cent, it was not possible to completely eliminate serial correlation. We tested for 
cointegration with the Johansen test, but we found that the matrix П in the following VEC 
representation  : 
1
1
−
=
= + + + +∑
p
j
it i j i,t- j i,t-1 t it
∆Y δ Γ ∆Y ΠY η u (6) 
was of full rank, meaning that the variables are found stationary and cannot by definition be 
cointegrated, and allowing us to move for the IRF and the identification of matrix A. The residual 
correlation reveals that lny seems to be in a simultaneous relationship with physical-capital stock 
and average years of education (Table A2 in the appendix), which is also what we observed in 
Section 2. Our identification strategy is based on the dual observation (derived from a Granger 
causality test) that a shock in per capita income may affect physical capital and that a shock in 
average years of education may affect the log of per capita GDP, but not vice versa. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. IRFs and cumulative IRFs from the PVAR 
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The IRFs not only confirm what we already learned from the ECM but also provide an 
insight into how education affects both per capita income and capital accumulation. It comes as no 
surprise that per capita income has a positive effect on education; since the share of 
savings/investments increases in tandem with income, for those of modest means the safest and 
most profitable investment is in education. Indeed, several studies have confirmed that the private 
rate of returns in Africa is positive.
58
 On the other hand, it seems that education does not affect per 
capita GDP in either the short or the long run, which means that there are virtually no social returns 
on education: a finding in line with that of  Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) for the United States prior 
                                                 
58
  See, for example, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, ‘Returns to investment in education’   
to the 1980s.
59
  
That private returns can be positive while social ones are insignificant or even negative is 
counterintuitive, but  Pritchett (2001) has found an explanation: a structural mismatch between an 
inefficient educational system and the labour market.
60
 Since positive private returns may exist 
simply because of the division of labour, the phenomenon is a cross-sectional/cross-individual one, 
an employee's earnings being a function of his or her skills and/or position, which are in turn a 
function of educational level; the marginal product of education has to be positive for it to yield any 
social returns. Educational level is positively correlated with private returns, but for it to be  
 
Fig. 2 Index of real wages in Africa (1990=100) 
 
 
Source: Mitchell, ‘International historical statistics’.  
 
correlated with per capita income there has to be a productivity increase at both the individual level 
(reflected in a real-wages increase) and the economy-wide one (through spillover effects). We find 
no evidence that this has occurred; until the 1980s real wages were outpaced by per capita GDP, 
and, worse yet, education's relationship to it was not just flat but negative. 
 The effects of education may work via other factors of production as well; for instance, it 
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  Acemoglu and Angrist, ‘How large are human-capital externalities?’.  
60
  Pritchett, ‘Where has all the education gone?’. 
⢠џ
may be positively correlated with an individual's savings rate, and hence with physical-capital 
accumulation. According to the IRFs, however, this is not the case in Africa: even though we obtain 
a positive hump in the IRF for capital stock as a response to a shock in education, the magnitude is 
insignificant.   
 Since we also found that a shock in physical capital  has only a short-run effect on per capita 
GDP growth, it follows that the changes in per capita GDP that occurred toward the end of the 
twentieth century were not due to perspiration (i.e. education and physical capital) but rather to 
inspiration factors (i.e. TFP). The coefficients of the year dummies from the ECM specification  
 
Fig. 3. TFP as estimated from the ECM specification in Table 7. 
 
 
 
(Table 7) can be interpreted as the trend of the growth of general productivity, or TFP (Figure 3). 
We also added information on TFP growth back to the 1920s based on a growth-accounting analysis 
in which we used the coefficients of education and physical capital from the ECM specification and 
the growth of African GDP, physical capital, and education up to 1950 (see the dashed line in Figure 
3). We find a set of two trends, in line with the history of twentieth-century Africa: an virtual 
absence of improvement until the 1980s and a period of significant improvement afterwards.   
That there was no significant TFP growth until the 1980s is in line with the observation of 
Hopkins (1973) that in West Africa technology was only of a labour-saving character in the 
Bagricultural sector.
61
 However, Austin shows that this was not the case in manufacturing,
62
 partly on 
account of trypanosomiasis (a parasitic disease, commonly known as sleeping sickness, transmitted 
by the tsetse fly) which prevented the large-scale use of animal power.
63
 Lovejoy shows that in the 
mining sector, as well, the lack of know-how prevented the introduction of many labour-saving 
technologies:
64
 an indication that when educational level rises so does TFP.
65
 We therefore test 
 
Table 8. Relationship between the estimated TFP and education 
 TFP ∆TFP 
constant -0.017 
(-3.80) 
-0.011 
(-2.40) 
1itS −  0.006 
(3.95) 
0.004 
(2.66) 
TFPt-1 - -0.626 
(-5.01) 
itS∆  - -0.0097 
(-0.44) 
R
2 
0.205 0.312 
DW 1.24 2.05 
Note: N=57, period: 1951-1998  
 
for the existence of such a relationship, by means of both a level-on-level and an ECM specification 
(Table 8) and find that education had a positive impact on TFP, although precisely through what 
channels remains to be determined. 
 We can say, however, that there are two possibilities which both increase TFP growth:  
education may improve the technical efficiency of the factors of production (that is, reverse the 
trend of diminishing returns to physical capital); and it may improve general productivity (that is, 
increase the maximum possible output per worker). Whereas general productivity determines the 
production frontier (the maximum possible output per person under optimum circumstances), 
technical efficiency determines just how far a country has to go to reach that frontier. We therefore 
                                                 
61
  Hopkins, An economic history of West Africa.  
62
  Austin, ‘Resources, techniques, and strategies’. 
63
  Austin and Headrick, ‘The role of technology in the African past’, pp. 170-1. 
64
  Lovejoy, Salt of the desert sun, pp. 112-14.   
65
  On the other hand, In Staying Poor Rimmer argues that Ghanaian growth during the colonial period was not 
obstructed by a lack of educated workers, since they existed in sufficient numbers to keep the cocoa sector 
operating. 
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divide TFP growth into a general-productivity and a technical-efficiency index.
66
 Technical 
efficiency is proportional to the elasticity at which factors of production are transformed into 
income (or final output). If we assume that this is the same for all geographical units (i), we can 
arrive at the standard relative-growth version of the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
it t it it
it t it it
y A k Sˆˆ
y A k S
= +α +β
&& &&
(7) 
, where 
t
t
A
A
&
is TFP growth and αˆ  and βˆ denote the coefficients in case of no technical 
inefficiencies.
67
 If we allow for technical inefficiency --  that is, if we assume that the coefficients of 
the production factors may vary across countries, we arrive at the following form: 
( ) ( )it t it it t it it it iti i i i
it t it it t it it it it
y k S k S k Sˆ ˆˆ ˆ
y k S k S k S
θ θ
= +α +β = +α +β + α −α + β −β
θ θ
& & && & & & &&
 (8) 
Where θ is a time-variant common productivity factor (similar to A in the standard-growth 
accounting in equation (7) but free of the effect of technical-efficiency differences, and α
i
 and β
i
 are 
the province-specific coefficients. By combining equations (7) and (8) we can show the 
relationships among TFP growth, general-technology growth, and technical efficiency of human  -    
and physical capital as follows: 
( ) ( )t t it iti i
t t it it
A k Sˆˆ
A k S
θ
= + α −α + β −β
θ
&& & &
 (9) 
In other words, the traditionally estimated TFP growth consists of the growth of general 
productivity (i.e., the outward movement of the productivity frontier) plus the difference in 
productivity of each factor of production compared with that of the most productive country (i.e., 
the technical efficiency of the factors of production).  
 We can make this decomposition by using the ECM specification from Table 7 and add 
cross-effects with country dummies for both education and physical capital. The year dummies 
                                                 
66
  Van Leeuwen, Van Leeuwen-Li and Foldvari, ‘Regional human capital in Republican and New China’.  
67
  It is important to note that the technical efficiency/inefficiency cannot be defined in absolute terms, only relative to 
the most efficient producer. Obviously in case of a standard Cobb-Douglas function we still do not expect that any 
of the coefficients or their sum would exceed one. 
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represent the trend in general-productivity growth (Figure 5) while TFP growth (Figure 3) minus 
general-productivity growth results in the growth of the technical efficiency of the factors of 
production (Figure 4).  
It is now clear that technical-efficiency growth was virtually zero until the 1960s: that is, 
that an increase in education or physical capital does not lead to  
 
Figure 4. Growth in technical efficiency 
 
 
Figure 5. Growth of  general productivity  
 
 
 
diminishing returns (Figures 4 and 5). The 1960s slump was followed by another one in the 1990s. 
Since TFP growth increased after the 1960s, this implies that (when technical efficiency has been 
subtracted) general productivity accelerates (Figure 5). 
 In order to determine whether education affects TFP growth by increasing the growth of 
technical efficiency or that of general productivity, we follow Mahadevan (2007) in applying a 
ꒀѠ
Granger causality test.
68
 We find that there is only a weak link between the perspiration factors 
(physical capital and education) and inspiration: education has a negative effect on general 
productivity, but it is small. However, this effect is more than offset by the positive effect that 
education has on technical efficiency:  not surprising, since physical capital also embodies 
 
Table 9. Granger causality tests 
effect average effect p-value verdict sign relation 
k affects technical efficiency 0.013 yes - 
technical efficiency affects k 0.952 no NA 
k affects general technology 0.058 no NA 
general technology affects k 0.007 yes + 
     
educ affects technical 
efficiency 0.010 yes + 
technical efficiency affects 
educ 0.674 no NA 
educ affects general 
technology 0.032 yes - 
general technology affects 
educ 0.046 yes - 
          
 
technology, and new investments require an increase in education so that new machines can be   
introduced into the production process.  If investments are not accompanied by education, one can 
expect the technical efficiency to diminish, since the decreasing marginal product of the capital is 
not offset by a proportional increase in human capital. 
 In regard to the inspiration-versus-perspiration debate, our findings suggest that it is per 
capita income that drives investments in physical capital and education in Africa and not vice versa. 
This suggests that Africa’s growth has been due mostly to TFP growth. Indeed, decomposing TFP 
growth into the technical efficiency of the factors of production (i.e., how far countries are from the 
productivity frontier) and general productivity (i.e., where the productivity frontier is located), we 
find that the latter drives most of African growth.  
 Even though education has a small effect on TFP growth via technical efficiency, it is 
certainly not the only factor driving this development.
69  
Austin (2008) singles out for mention the 
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  Mahadevan, ‘Perspiration versus inspiration’.  
69
  See also Bolt and Bezemer, ‘Understanding long-run African growth’.  
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introduction of  high-yielding crops
70
 and crop rotation and of mechanization in the transport and 
industry sectors.
71
 However, we differ from Austin in that we find that these developments have no 
significant impact on growth until the 1960s.   
 
 
IV 
In the previous section we found, in regard to education's effect on per capita income in Africa,  that 
there was no direct but rather an indirect effect via TFP. Yet, after decomposing TFP into technical 
efficiency and general productivity, we found that the effect of education only worked via technical 
efficiency and was no more than a narrow and indirect channel. This matches well with Austin’s 
(2008) claim that most of the increase in Africa's TFP during the twentieth century was caused by 
factors other than physical capital and education.
72
 This means that the effect of education on 
inequality via increased levels of income is at best marginal. However, as outlined in the 
introduction, there are two more channels via which education might affect income inequality. First, 
a reduction in educational inequality may, given the higher wages of skilled labourers, reduce 
income inequality as well.
73
 Second, an excess supply of education may lower the price of skilled 
labour and, hence, reduce income inequality. In order to test both hypotheses, we run a regression 
between income inequality and educational inequality.  
The data on long-run income inequality in Africa are scanty; fortunately, Van Zanden et al. 
(2012) have created a long-run dataset with Gini coefficients for benchmark years between 1820 
and 2000.
74
 However, this dataset has two drawbacks: the Maddison GDP estimates are used to 
proxy for country inequality; and data for North Africa are not reported in the tables.  We therefore 
add the GDP per capita estimates for individual countries from Prados de la Escosura (2011),
75
 for   
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Table 10. Income inequality in Africa, 1870-2000 
  
Within 
country 
inequality 
Between 
country 
inequality 
Sum 
column 
a+b 
Overlap 
factor 
Total 
inequality 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1870 0.48 0.25 0.73 0.21 0.52 
1890 0.35 0.24 0.59 0.19 0.40 
1910 0.41 0.25 0.65 0.18 0.47 
1929 0.47 0.26 0.72 0.18 0.54 
1950 0.42 0.29 0.71 0.19 0.53 
1960 0.52 0.30 0.81 0.22 0.60 
1970 0.48 0.32 0.80 0.24 0.57 
1980 0.46 0.36 0.82 0.26 0.56 
1990 0.47 0.37 0.84 0.27 0.57 
1995 0.47 0.38 0.85 0.27 0.58 
2000 0.50 0.40 0.89 0.29 0.60 
            
 
the years 1929, 1910, 1890, and 1870  and provide inequality estimates for the North  African 
countries (Table 10). We find that, after 1890, rising inter-country inequality is a worldwide 
phenomenon, but rising intra-country inequality is unique to Africa, and is particularly pronounced 
in the southern region, which is also the one with the highest per capita income.   
 The results of the second part of the equation, regarding educational inequality, are reported 
in Figure 6; the method used is the one described in Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000), Checchi (2004), 
and Castelló and Doménech (2002).76 These results are weighted: that is, when a country drops out, 
its weight is transferred to the country in the same group that most closely resembles it in terms of 
educational inequality. This weighting is a matter of significance, 
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  Thomas, Wang, and Fan, ‘Measuring education inequality’; Checchi, ‘Does educational achievement help’; Castelló 
and Doménech, ‘Human capital inequality and economic growth’, p. 4.   
>Figure 6. Gini of educational inequality in Africa by sub-region, ca. 1890-2010 
 
 
 
since the best data for the earlier periods are for those countries with the highest levels of education 
and, consequently, the lowest levels of educational inequality. Again, we find that educational 
inequality is significantly lower in the southern region than elsewhere, whereas in the northern 
region there is no improvement until the decade of the 1970s, when per capita income there began 
to grow: a correlation in line with our finding that an increase in educational level does not cause 
but instead is caused by an increase in average income (and, by extension, a decrease in income 
inequality).  
 However, as argued regarding channel two and three through which education may affect 
income inequality, a rise in educational inequality may lead to a rise in income irrespective of 
average income. Using the data on educational and income inequality, we therefore now turn our 
attention to the relations among income inequality, educational inequality, and educational 
attainment (Table 11). Because simultaneity is possible, we also employ a 2SLS regression with 
lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments and the growth rate of  
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Table 11. Income inequality explained by educational inequality and educational attainment 
 income inequality income inequality 
(2sls) 
constant 20.29 
(0.86) 
81.93 
(0.78) 
itS  
3.24 
(1.71) 
6.46 
(1.19) 
educ ineq 1.561 
(3.21) 
1.932 
(2.67) 
educ ineq squared -0.021 
(-2.35) 
-0.022 
(-1.80) 
educ ineq cube 0.0001 
(2.12) 
0.0001 
(1.67) 
ln ity  
-3.34 
(-0.91) 
-16.2 
(-0.84) 
R
2 
0.693 0.607 
N 183 179 
Sargan test - 0.201 
(p-value=0.347, d.f. 
=1) 
Note: instruments: population growth rate, fifth lags of education inequality and its square and cube, fourth and fifth 
lags of education. 
 
population as instrument for the per capita income (a choice motivated by the Solow model). 
This instrumentation, causes no significant change in the results. We find a non-linear 
relationship between income and educational inequalities the coefficient of the level of average 
years of education remaining insignificant, as expected, since we had found no relationship between 
income level and educational attainment on the macro level. The nonlinearity follows fist a peak, 
consistent with the finding of a Kuznets type of relation between educational and income inequality 
(channel 2) followed by a small through suggesting that on average there was an excess demand of 
education in Africa which caused a rise in the demand for education (channel 3).  
Hence, whereas we found no relation between the level of education and the level of per 
capita GDP, the two channels focussing on educational inequality do lead to changes in income 
inequality. But to what extent could a reduction in educational inequality lead to a reduction in 
income inequality?  If (on the basis of the coefficients in Table 11) the mean of the educational Gini 
at the end of the twentieth century, 45.35 were reduced to zero, income inequality would be reduced 
by 36.9: a significant effect, since the mean intra-country income Gini in 1990 was 47.  Hence, even 
though there is no direct effect of the level of education, via educational inequality governments 
䥐ѣ
still have a strong policy measure to alleviate income inequality. 
 
V 
In recent decades Africa has always been identified with poor growth performance and inequality. 
However, this generally ignores that in the 1950s Africa still was a region with more economic 
potential than Asia. This “reversal of fortune” has been largely identified by scholars on Asia by 
pointing at the perspiration factors (i.e. the fast growing accumulation of physical capital and 
education). However, with the exception of Austin
77
 most studies on Africa have focussed rather on 
institutions and geography than on the factors of production. In this paper we try partly to remedy 
this shortcoming for Africa. Hereby we focus on the important question how education affects 
income inequality. This is important because education is one of the few instruments a government 
can influence and, hence, potentially might use to fight income inequality.  
We identified three ways in which education may affect income inequality. First, it may 
generate higher income and thereby reduce income inequality. However, we found very little 
evidence that it does. Rather, we found, in accordance with much of the literature on Africa, that it 
was TFP, as opposed to education and physical capital, that has a significant effect on GDP per 
capita. However, by decomposing TFP growth in, on the one hand, the growth of the efficiency of 
education and physical capital and, on the other hand, the growth of the general-productivity 
frontier, we did find that education had a small but positive effect on GDP via technical efficiency.  
 Second, by reducing educational inequality and hence (in the form of the relatively high 
wages paid for skilled labour), education may affect income inequality. Third, an excess supply of 
education may lower the price of skilled labour. Testing the latter two possibilities, we found there 
was indeed a strong, non-linear, relationship between educational and income inequality. Initially, 
with a rise in educational inequality, we found indeed a rise in income inequality. The decline in 
educational inequality at the end of the twentieth century, however, also reduced income inequality. 
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Yet, we do see that in the final decades income inequality rose again which may be attributed to an 
excess demand for skilled labour which drove up its price.  
 Hence, even though the level of education does not affect income inequality via per capita 
GDP in a significant way, still it did affect income inequality via the other two channels we 
identified.  Using our calculations of the last decade of the 20
th
 century, we can calculate that 
reducing by reducing educational inequality to zero, a government could achieve a decline in 
income inequality by no less than 81%. Hence, for present day African countries a focus on 
educational distribution may have significant distribution affects even iof it does not enhance 
economic growth in a significant way. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Im, Pesaran and Shin unit-root tests (individual unit-root processes and individual effects 
are assumed) 
lnyit lnkit Sit 
1.928 (0.973) 1.343 (0.910) 2.948 (0.998) 
∆lnyit ∆lnkit ∆Sit 
-36.62 (0.000) -7.906 (0.000) -5.565 (0.000) 
∆2lnyit ∆2lnkit ∆2Sit 
-59.03 (0.000) -47.86 (0.000) -52.88 (0.000) 
Note: p-values are reported between parentheses. H0: non-stationartiy 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.  Residual correlations form the VAR(9) specification 
 lny lnk S 
lny 1   
lnk 0.191 
(0.000) 
1  
S -0.042 
(0.069) 
0.019 
(0.398) 
1 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses 
